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MONETARY MANAGEMENT AND THE CURRENT
ROLE OF BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS

Dr.O.A. Vchendu.
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Abstract
The purpose ofthis paper is to discuss the role ofthe Bretton Woods
Institutions (The World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund,
IMF) in global monetary management with particular emphasis on the
Funds relationship with Nigeria. The Bretton Woods Institutions have
statutory responsibility to interact with member countries. However, this
relationship has been misunderstood probably because of their perceived
"intrusive " nature. The paper concluded that the Institutions have had
important role to play in global monetary management and expected that
this role will continue in the future to the extent that it is to the best interest of
the world economy. This axiom is also applicabfe in the case ofNigeria.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The involvement of the Bretton Woods Institutions, namely, the
World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund in monetary
management in recent years has largely been misunderstood, at times very
controversial, and often invokes hostilities. The reason for the confusion
appears to be related to the perceived "intrusion" of these institutions in the
sovereign affairs of independent states. The reality, however, is that the
Bank and the Fund have the statutory rights to interact with their member
Dr. 0 . A. Uchendu, Deputy Director/Special Assistant to the Governor, Central Bank of
Nigeria. A version of the paper was presented at the Monetary Policy Seminar organised by the
CBN Training School. All opinions and omissions are. however. those of the author.
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countries, including those in economic and financial crises.
Because of the tendency of the Institutions to prescr~be corrective but
harsh fiscal and monetary policy regimes to countries experiencing
economic problems, they seem to personify the source of the hardship of
those countries, thereby making the institutions quite unpopular. It is quite
educative · to note, however, that many governments implement these
policies in tacit agreement with the World Bank andHv1F. Most of the time,
they take the credit if the programmes succeed, but blame the Bank and the
Fund for the hardship associated with implementing the programmes to
protect themselves from the expected political fall out. The relationship
between the Bretton Woods Institutions and nations in economic and
financial crises is likened to that of a doctor and a patient. The doctor
prescribes pills to a patient to heal the patient's illness. Thus, it is either the
patient purchases and swallows the pills to recover or abandons them at the
patient's detriment.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the cwi-ent role of the Bretton
Woods Institutions in monetary management with particular reference to
the Fund's relationship with Nigeria. The overview of the origins of the
international financial architecture, centred around the Bretton Woods
Institutions is presented in Section II. The IMF 's role in monetary
management in Nigeria and the implications of the CBN autonomy under
the relationship are discussed in Section III. The paper is concluded in
Section IV where the future role of the Bretton Woods Institutions 111
monetary management is also discussed.

,
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ORIGINS OF THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS

The Bretton Woods Institutions, comprising the World Bank Group
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were established in 1944 at a
conference held in the town of Bretton Woods in the State of New
Hampshire, United States of America. The IMF was set up to mid-wife the
fixed but adjustable par values of exchange rate system. Under the system,
according to Ahluwalia (1999), countries agreed to (i) maintain their
exchange rates within a very narrow range of declared par values, which
would only be changed with the prior approval of the IMF; and (ii) avoid
cmTent account payment restrictions. The idea was to stem past unilateral
exchange rate policy measures such as devaluations. The Fund was also
expected to provide short-term finance to cover temporary balance of
payments disequilibrium on the agreement that such a country will
implement certain policy measures.
These policies constitute the
" conditionality" which the Fund expects, if properly implemented, would
return the country's external account position to a balance. The types of
IMF financial facilities, purpose, conditions and characteristics are shown
in Table I.
The World Bank, on the other hand, was set up to finance the
reconstruction of countries devastated by the Second World War as well as
develop poor countries. The financing of the reconstruction work was taken
over by the Marshall Plan instituted later by the United States, which left the
Bank mainly with the responsibility of development financing. Dw·ing the
early years, the Bank concentrated on long-term, structural and sectoral
related lending, while the Fund focussed on short-term macroeconomic and
balance of payment policy activities.

26
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Table I: IMF FINANCIAL FACILITIES
Pwpore

Conditions

Phasing and Monl1oring

Stand-by Arrangements
(1952)

Short-lerm assistance for courtries
with balance of paymerts difficulties
of a short-term character

Adopt policies that provide
confidence that the me1rber's
balance of payments dllflculties
wiU be resolved within a reasonable
period.

Quarterly purchases(dlsbt.rsements)
contlngert on observance of performance
criteria and other conditions

Exlended Fuid Facility
(1974)

Longer-term assistance to s~port
meni>ers stru:tural reform; to
address balance of paymerts
dHlicultles of a longterm character

Adopt 3-year program, with
stroctural agenda, with amual
detailed statement of policies for
the next 12 morths

Quarterly or seniamual pt.rchases
(disbursemeris) contingenl on observance
of performance criteria and other conditions

Supplemental
Reserve Facility
(1997)

Short-term assistance for balance of
payments dHliculties related to
crises of market cortidence

Available orly In context of regular
arrangements with associated
program and with strengthened
poHcies to address toss of mali<et
cortldence

Facility available for one year, lrortloaded
access with two or more purchases
(disbursemeris)

Contingent
Credit line
(1999)

Precautionary line of defense that
would be made readily avaRable
against balance of payments dllficultles
arising from contagion

Eligibllfy Criteria: (1) absence of
balance of payments need from
the outset. (2) posll/e assessment
of pottcles by the IMF, (3)
constroctl/e relations with prtvate
creditors and satisfactory progress
in liniting external vutnerabllity.
(4) satisfactory econorric program.

Resources approved for ~ to one yea,
smaa amount (5%-25% of qoota) available
on approval but not expected to be drawn
Prest.rnption that one-third of resot.rces are
released on activatiol\ with the phasing of
the remainder determined by a postactl/ation
ll!Yiew;

Con-ciensatory
Rnancing
Facility

Medium term assistance for te111)0rary
export shorttalls or cereal
in1)0rt excesses. (A provision for use In
cases of other contingencies was
eliminated in 2000)

Available orly when a merroer has an
arrangement with upper credit tranche
conditionality, or when its balance of
payments position Is otherwise
satisfactory

Typically disbursed over a rrinilrum of 6
months In accordance with the phasing
provisions of the arrangemert

Credit Foclll1y
Crecit Tranches and Extencled fwld Fadl1y

Specia I F>cilities

Emergency
Assistance

Qt.ick. medium-term assistance for

None, although postconflict assistance can
be segmented into two or more purchases
1T0de available in exceptional cases

Balance of paymerts dHllculties
related to:

(1) Natural disasters
(1962)

(1) To help finance recovery ellorts and
support econorric adjustment programs
alter natural disasters

(1) Reasonable efforts to overcome
balance of payments dilficlffies

(2) PostconlHct
(1995)

(2) To help establish macroeconorric
stability in the aftermath of cllli unrest,
political tt.rrroil. or International armed
conflict

(2) Focus on instltutlonal and
adrriristratl/e capacfy blilding to
pave the way toward an upper credit
tranche arrangment or PRGF

Longer-term assistance for deep-seated
balance of payments dWliculties of
stroctural nature; alms at sustained
poverty-redoclng growth

PRGF-supported programs are based Semianrual (or occasionally quarterty)
on a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper disbursements cortlngern on observance
(PRSP) prepared by the coll'llry In a
of performance criteria and reviews
partk:lpatory process, and Integrating
1T0croecononric, strocutral, and
poverty redoction policies

F>cKlly tor Low-lncomo Members
Poverty Redu:tion
and Growth facility
(1999)
(Replaced the
Enhanced Stru:tural
Adjustmert Facility)

The IMF's lending is financed from the capital subscribed by member countries; each country is assigned a quota that represents its
financial commitment. A member provides a portion of its quota in foreign currencies acceptable to the IMF-or the IMF-or in SDRs-and the
remainder in its own currency. An IMF loan is disbursed or drawn by the borrower purchasing foreign currency assets from the IMF with its
own c urrency. Repayment of the loan is achieved by the borrower repurchasing its currency from the IMF with foreign currency. The table
is adapted from Table4.1 of the IMF2002Annua! Report.
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The collapse of the par value system in 1973 and the subsequent
floating of major industrial countries currencies as well as the reduced use
of Fund's resources by industrial countries' increased the Fund's exposure
to developing countries. In the same vein, in realizing that developing
countries' balance of payments difficulties were related to structural
problems, the Bank started to advance structural adjustment loans intended
to improve macroeconomic perfo1mance which could have led to the
balance of payment problem in the first instance. Thus, over the years, the
changing world economy influenced the institutional anangements for
global monetary management, drawing the policy frameworks of the World
Bank and IMF quite closer, while their policy prescriptions influenced the
thrust of inte1national monetary management.

III.

IMF AND MONETARY MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA

Nigeria became a member of the IMF on March 30, 1961 shortly after
independence on October 1, 1960. Up till the early 1980s, Nigeria enjoyed
respectful relationship with the IMF. After Nigeria assumed responsibility
for the huge Paris Club debt and Nigerian economic performance declined,
the Fund increased its surveillance over Nigeria while also acting as agent
for the Paris Club group of countries. Specifically, it was the initiation of
,the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986 by Nigeria to conect
macroeconomic and structural imbalances in the economy that drew the
country and the Fund closer.
Between 1986 and 1992, the Fund established three standby
arrangements ( SBA), an10unting to SDR 1.44 billion for financial support
to the SAP. While Nigeria was involved in the design and implementation
of the SAP, it however, refused to draw down the financial facility
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established to support the adjustment projects and programmes which could
have ameliorated some of the social problems associated with the SAP
because of political considerations.
The first SBA (January 1987-January 1988) under the SAP involved
an1ong other measures, financial sector reforms and liberalization. The key
policy thrust was to realign the naira exchange rate to make it more market
determined under the framework of the Second-tier Foreign Exchange
Market (SFEM). An official rate for some limited transactions requiring
Presidential approval was, however, retained. The second SBA progran1me
(February 1989 - April I 990), targeted fiscal sector adjustment as well as
banking system refom1s and liberalization. During the period, entry of new
banks and other financial institutions were encouraged to enhance
competition and improved financial intermediation. In addition, the
Federal Government and parastatal accounts with commercial and
merchant banks were transferred to the CBN to control excess reserves in
the banking system, thereby curbing the ability of retail banks to create
credit. As a result, banking system liquidity was substantially reduced,
leading to a sharp drop in the growth of monetary aggregates while the.naira
exchange rate attained relative stability. Furthermore, the number of banks
in Nigeria increased substantially from 41 in 1986 to 107 in 1990. The third
Standby Arrangement covered January 9, 1991 to April 8, 1992 but was
derailed by unanticipated excess liquidity unleashed by extra-budgetary
expenditure arising from the political transition experiment at that time.
Again, on February 22, 1999, Nigeria entered into an informal
arrangement with the HvfF under a Staff-Monitored Progran1me (SMP). A
Staff-Monitored Programme is the Fund's instrument for dialogue with
member countries without the support of the Fund's financial resources nor
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the approval of its Executive Board. Under the programme, Nigeria
planned to maintain tight monetary stance by limiting CBN's credit to both
the public and private sectors of the economy; maintain stable exchange rate
of the naira; and ensure sound and healthy financial system with a firm
policy of not _bailing out distressed banks. It was envisaged that the
restoration of the CBN 's instrument autonomy in December, 1998 would
enhance the realization of the above goals. By end 1999, the gains of the
SMP was limited by existing structural rigidities and fiscal dominance.
However, the inflation rate was brought under control from I 0.0 per cent in
1998 to 16.6 per cent as at end-1999.
th

Nigeria's fourth SBA with the Fw1d was programmed to last from 4
August, 2000 to 31 st October, 2001 . The monetary programme component
of the Anangement included:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Reducing the growth of money supply;
Increasing net international reserves;
Maintaining stable and market determined exchange rate; and
Strengthening supervisory and regulatory activities over the
financial sector to improve system soundness and enhance the
effectiveness and efficiency of monetary policy.

The Federal Government further agreed to improve liquidity
management by reducing government balances with commercial banks.
Specific policy targets expected to be realised under the forth Arrangement
included sale of treasury bills and CBN certificates worth N40 billion and
up to NI 00 billion, respectively; unification of inter-bank foreign exchange
market rates; reduction of forei gn exchange premium between the official
and parallel market exchange rates to not more than IO per cent; and
reduction of net foreign assets, net domestic assets, net claims on

CBN Economic & Financial Review Vol. 41 , No. 1

30

government and reserve money to agreed optimal levels.
The rationale behind the Fund's policy prescriptions can be explained
by observing that money supply (M2), broadly defined, equals net domestic
credit (NDC), net foreign assets (NFA) and other assets (net), OAN . In
other words,
M2 = NDC + NFA + OAN .......................... .......... (1)
NDC is the sum of net credit to government and private sectors. In the
simplest and short terms, NDC is expected to be sensitive largely to interest
rate changes, while NFA is influenced mainly by exchange rate movements.
Thus, theoretically by raising the treaswy bill issue rate, which also has
influence on other interest rates in the economy, and devaluing the naira
exchange rate, the NDC and NFA are expected to decline and rise,
respectively, thereby influencing the growth of the money supply in the
desired direction, all other things being equal . Thus,
M2 = NDC(r) + NFA(e) +OAN .......................... (2)
where, rand e are interest and exchange rates which are the monetary
policy instruments and
NDC/ r <O, NFA / e >O

In practice, however, the net effect of the upward review of interest
rate and devaluation of the naira exchange rate on money supply, M2, a good
measure of liquidity in the banking system, actually depends on the relative
impacts of the changes in interest rates and exchange rate which generally
also affect each other dynamically. Furthermore, the expected positive
impact of the increase in interest rate in reducing the growth of money
supply is dampened by the interest rate insensitivity of government ·
borrowing from the banking system .
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Before proceeding to discuss the implementation and outcome of the
programme, it is pertinent at this point to address the issue of the autonomy
of the CBN in monetary management in Nigeria, especially, the often
mistaken role of the IMF. The CBN has instrument autonomy in the
conduct of monetary policy. What this means is that the Bank can use legal
instruments and measures it deems fit to achieve the goal of maintaining
price stability. However, in performing this function, the Bank has to take
its stakeholders, namely, private sector operators, the executive and the
legislative arms of government as well as the international financial
community along in the process. fn other words, the Central Bank
Governor must be able t) implement the instruments of the autonomy with
tact to ensure harmonv with other policies of government and overall
interest of the Nigerian ~conomy.

It is in this regard that the implementation of the 200 I SBA and its
perforn1ance can be evaluated. For instance, while thl· Fund preferred
higher treasury bill issue rate c1s a mechanism to control ex ;ess liquidity, the
CBN considered other factor~, including negative effects of high interest
rates on the real sector in takir,g action it deemed fit in the best interest of the
overall economy Similarly, the thorny issue of merging the rates in all
segments of the foreign exchange market was another area the CBN took a
critical look before taking policy action, considering the fact that many nonmonetary factors influence the existence of the segmented exchange rates of
the naira. Besides, the adoption of the Dutch Auction Sy~tem in July 2002
which lays greater emphasis on market mechanisms in determining the
naira exchange rate, without the prompting of the IMF, Jemonstrated the
CB N's autonomy in making appropriate policies for the domestic economy.
The performance of the fourth SBA after one year implementation
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was mixed. The growth of monetary aggregates exceeded targets, while the
inflation rate increased from 6.9 per cent in 2000 to 18.9 per cent in 2001.
Buoyed by strong demand for oil, the external sector performed above
target. Overall, while the fourth SBA ended without completely achieving
its goals, subsequent informal efforts were made by the Fund and Nigeria in
2002 to continue with the policy dialogue and to monitor economic
developments in the country. However, these latest efforts were truncated
in March, 2002 because of the Fund's fear that the country could not
successfully implement a Staff-Monitored Programme owing to the
perceived unrealistic provisions of the 2002 Federal Government Budget.
Nevertheless, Ilv1F missions arrived in Nigeria in June and October, 2002
for the regular Article IV consultations on economic matters, reemphasizing the fact that the door is never closed on the Bretton Woods
Institutions.
IV

FUTURE ROLE OF THE BRETTON WOODS
INSTITUTIONS IN MONETARY MANAGEMENT

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Bretton Woods Institutions
influence monetary management globally, and in Nigeria in parti cular to the
extent that the policies are consistent with other policies of government. It
is expected that they will continue their supervisory roles over international
financial markets in the future. However, the form of their intervention will
be shaped by evolving global financial and economic developments.
In retrospect, the lessons learnt from the experiences of Asia, the
Russian Federation, Brazil and more recently Argentina have already
influenced the focus of global monetary management on capital account
flow management. The main tenets of the new financial archi tectureJ being
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put in place to contain contagion arising frorp capital account flow problems
include:
(i)
strengthening the financial sector in developing countries;
(ii)
improving bilateral and multi lateral surveillance;
(iii)
making the IMF a genuine lender oflastresort;
(iv)
introducing mechanisms for orderly negotiations with private
creditors;
(v)
managing the social consequences of crisis; and
(vi)
creating an internationally agreed regime for restrictions on capital
account flows.
In addition, emphasis is being placed on designing home grown policies
which individual countries could claim ownership as a substitute for the
"one policy fits all" past policy prescriptions of the Bretton Woods
Institutions.
The CBN, on its pait, will continue to interact with the World Bank
and the Fund as a member of the Bretton Woods Institution ai1djudiciously
use policy instruments available to it to regulate ai1d supervise the Nigerian
economy efficiently ai1d effectively.
In conclusion, the paper is of the opinion that the Bretton Woods
Institutions have pervasive influence ai1d important role to play cunently
and in the future in domestic and global monetary management.

For detailed discussion, see Ahluwalia (1999) "The IMF and the World Bank in the New Financial Architecture:
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